30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (2019)
242 Cal.Rptr.3d 268
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
VELIA DUEÑAS, Defendant and Appellant.
No. B285645.
Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division Seven.
January 8, 2019.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Super. Ct. No. 5VY02034, Eric P. Harmon, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Public Counsel, Kathryn Eidmann, Elizabeth Hadaway, Alisa Hartz and Mark D. Rosenbaum for Defendant and Appellant.
Clare Pastore; Michael Kaufman and Devon Porter for American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California and American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego and Imperial Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
East Bay Community Law Center, Theresa Zhen and Brandon Greene for A New Way of Life Reentry Project, American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, All of Us Or None—Los Angeles, All of Us Or None—San Francisco, Bay Area Legal Aid, California Association of Local Conservation Corps, California Reinvestment Coalition, Californians for Safety and Justice, Civicorps, Community Coalition, Contra Costa County Public Defender, Contra Costa Racial Justice Coalition, Drug Policy Alliance, East Bay Community Law Center, Ella Baker Center, Equal Justice Society, Essie Justice Group, Hillary Blout, Homeboy Industries, Law Enforcement Action Partnership, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, Legal Services of Northern California, Legal Services for Prisoners with Children, Neighborhood Legal Services of Los Angeles County, Root & Rebound and Rubicon Programs as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim, Drooks, Lincenberg & Rhow, A. Howard Matz and Peter A. Goldschmidt for Los Angeles County Bar Association,
1160
part of a larger statutory scheme to raise revenue to fund court operations, should be treated no differently than their civil counterparts enacted in the same legislation and imposed only on those with the means to pay them. (See
Jameson v. Desta, supra,
5 Cal.5th 594, 622
["[U]nder California law when a litigant in a judicial proceeding has qualified for in forma pauperis status, a court may not consign the indigent litigant to a costly ... procedure that the litigant cannot afford and that effectively negates the purpose and benefit of in forma pauperis status"].)
[5]
II.
The Execution of the Restitution Fine Must Be Stayed
California law provides for two types of restitution: direct restitution to the victim (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f)), which is based on a direct victim's loss, and a restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (b)), which is not. Payment of direct victim restitution goes directly to victims and compensates them for economic losses they have suffered because of the defendant's crime. (
People v. Giordano
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 651-652 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 170 P.3d 623]
.) Direct victim restitution was not ordered and is not at issue in this case.
Here, the trial court imposed a restitution fine on Dueñas. Restitution fines are set at the discretion of the court in an amount commensurate with the seriousness of the offense and within a range set by statute. (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (b).) At all times relevant to this matter, the minimum restitution fine for a misdemeanor was $150 and the maximum restitution fine was $1000. (
Ibid.
) Restitution fines are not paid to the victim of the crime. Instead, they are paid into a statewide victim compensation fund. (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (e).)
Unlike the assessments discussed above, the restitution fine is intended to be, and is recognized as, additional punishment for a crime. (
People v. Hanson
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 355, 363 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 58, 1 P.3d 650]
.) When imposed on a probationer, restitution fines are conditions of probation. (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (m).) Any unpaid restitution fines remaining at the end of the probationary term are enforceable as a civil judgment. (Pen. Code, § 1202.43;
People v. Willie
(2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 43, 47-48 [34 Cal.Rptr.3d 532]
.) A restitution fine is a debt of the defendant to the state that may be enforced by
1170
Beverly Hills Bar Association, Bar Association of San Francisco and Western Center of Law and Poverty as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Albert J. Menaster, Head Deputy Public Defender (Los Angeles), for Los Angeles County Public Defender as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Michael N. Feuer, City Attorney, Debbie Lew, Assistant City Attorney, and Rolando R. Reyes, Deputy City Attorney, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Jackie Lacey, District Attorney (Los Angeles), Phyllis C. Asayama and Matthew Brown, Deputy District Attorneys, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
The family of four receives $350 per month in California Work Opportunity and Responsibility to Kids cash benefits and $649 per month in CalFresh food stamps benefits. Dueñas uses all the money she receives to take care of the children, but she cannot afford basic necessities for her family. She has no bank account and no credit card. She owns only her clothing and a mobile phone, and her mobile phone service is frequently disconnected because she cannot afford the $40 per month payment.
The family has no home of their own; they alternate between staying at Dueñas's mother's home and the home of her mother-in-law. The electricity was cut off to her mother-in-law's home because the family could not afford to pay the bill.
A.
Prior Legal Proceedings
When Dueñas was a teenager, she received three juvenile citations. She could not afford to pay the $1,088 she was assessed for these citations. Because she could not pay her debt, her driver's license was suspended. Dueñas was unable to have her driver's license reinstated because she could not afford the fees, and she did not qualify for the state amnesty program.
Over the next several years, Dueñas suffered three misdemeanor convictions for driving with a suspended license and one conviction for failing to appear on a driving without a license case. In these cases, Dueñas was offered the ostensible choice of paying a fine or serving jail time in lieu of payment. Each time, she could not afford the fees, so she served time in jail—a total of 51 days across four cases. Additionally, she was sentenced to 90 days in jail for driving with a suspended license. In total, Dueñas was sentenced to 141 days in jail for driving with a driver's license that had been suspended because she had been unable to pay her juvenile citations.
Even after serving her jail time, Dueñas remained liable for court fees associated with each misdemeanor conviction. In one case, she was also ordered to pay attorney fees. She was unable to pay those amounts, and they were sent to collections. Dueñas receives letters from collection agencies, but she has no way to pay off her debt.
B.
Present Proceedings
On July 13, 2015, Dueñas pleaded no contest to another misdemeanor charge of driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a)) based on a plea agreement that conditioned the consequences for the conviction on whether she obtained a valid driver's license by the time of the sentencing hearing. If Dueñas returned to court on the date of sentencing
1162
that Dueñas was homeless, "it might be simpler to do it here in court" rather than require her to see the financial evaluator. The court said that it did not make sense for it to "sort through the documents myself" and that she should "avail herself of the expertise of the financial evaluator." The court offered some flexibility in setting the date of the hearing but cautioned, "I don't want to get into the habit of having litigants determine what day they want to come back." The court also stated its belief, which was inaccurate, that if Dueñas were to be unable to appear for the hearing, the fees and fines would not be sent to collections or transformed into a civil judgment.
At the March 17, 2016 ability to pay hearing, the court reviewed Dueñas's uncontested declaration concerning her financial circumstances, determined that she lacked the ability to pay the previously ordered attorney fees, and waived them on the basis of her indigence. The court concluded that the $30 court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373 and $40 court operations assessment under Penal Code section 1465.8 were both mandatory regardless of Dueñas's inability to pay them. With respect to the $150 restitution fine, the court found that Dueñas had not shown the "compelling and extraordinary reasons" required by statute (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (c)) to justify waiving this fine. The court rejected Dueñas's constitutional arguments that due process and equal protection required the court to consider her ability to pay these fines and assessments, and ordered her to pay $220 by February 21, 2019. The trial court told Dueñas that, "[i]f in the end you're not able to pay, you won't be punished for it. Those [sums] will go to collections without any further order from this court."
The superior court appellate division affirmed the trial court's order. We granted Dueñas's petition to transfer the case to the Court of Appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1002.)
DISCUSSION
"Raising money for government through law enforcement whatever the source—parking tickets, police-issued citations, court-imposed fees, bills for court appointed attorneys, punitive fines, incarceration charges, supervision fees, and more—can lay a debt trap for the poor. When a minor offense produces a debt, that debt, along with the attendant court appearances, can lead to loss of employment or shelter, compounding interest, yet more legal action, and an ever-expanding financial burden—a cycle as predictable and counterproductive as it is intractable." (
Rivera v. Orange County Probation Dept.
(9th Cir. 2016) 832 F.3d 1103, 1112, fn. 7
.) The record in this matter illustrates the cascading consequences of imposing fines and assessments that a defendant cannot pay.
1164
461 U.S. 660 (1983)
BEARDEN
v.
GEORGIA
No. 81-6633.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued January 11, 1983.
Decided May 24, 1983.
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF GEORGIA
661
351 U.S. 12 (1956)
GRIFFIN ET AL.
v.
ILLINOIS.
No. 95.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued December 7, 1955.
Decided April 23, 1956.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.
Charles A. Horsky,
acting under appointment by the Court, 349 U. S. 949, argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.
13
3 Cal.3d 100 (1970)
473 P.2d 999
89 Cal. Rptr. 255
In re SIMEON ANTAZO on Habeas Corpus.
Docket No. Crim. 13857.
Supreme Court of California. In Bank.
September 3, 1970.
103
court that dismissal of the charges and relief from the penalties of the offense is in the interest of justice. (Pen. Code, § 1203.4, subd. (a)(1).)
In this statutory scheme, therefore, the wealthy defendant is offered an ultimate outcome that the indigent one will never be able to obtain—the successful completion of all the terms of probation and the resultant absolute right to relief from the conviction, charges, penalties, and disabilities of the offense. At best, indigent defendants who cannot pay their restitution fine can try to persuade a trial court to exercise its discretion to grant them relief, despite their failure to comply with all terms of probation; at worst, they are deprived of relief, with all the collateral consequences that the legislation was designed to avoid. This result arises solely and exclusively from their poverty.
The statutory scheme thus results in a limitation of rights to those who are unable to pay. The heart of the due process inquiry is whether it is "fundamentally unfair" to use the criminal justice system to impose punitive burdens on probationers who have "made all reasonable efforts to pay the fine or restitution, and yet cannot do so through no fault of [their] own...." (
Bearden, supra,
461 U.S. at p. 668
.) Penal Code section 1203.4 is not a substitute for due process.
[8]
The People minimize the difference between expungement as of right and upon discretion in the interest of justice, asserting that Dueñas "fails to explain why this discretionary relief would be denied to those who demonstrate an inability to pay in their expungement applications." But given that restitution is a condition of probation, and the restitution statute instructs the trial court that a defendant's inability to pay is an illegitimate consideration in imposing the minimum restitution fine, it is not at all clear that a trial court would treat inability to pay as a legitimate consideration in determining
1172
he lacked the resources to pay it. Both
Williams
and
Tate
carefully distinguished this substantive limitation on the imprisonment of indigents from the situation where a defendant was at fault in failing to pay the fine. As the Court made clear in
Williams,
"nothing in our decision today precludes imprisonment for willful refusal to pay a fine or court costs."
399 U. S., at 242, n. 19
. Likewise in
Tate,
the Court "emphasize[d] that our holding today does not suggest any constitutional infirmity in imprisonment of a defendant with the means to pay a fine who refuses or neglects to do so."
401 U. S., at 400
.
This distinction, based on the reasons for nonpayment, is of critical importance here. If the probationer has willfully refused to pay the fine or restitution when he has the means to pay, the State is perfectly justified in using imprisonment as a sanction to enforce collection. See ALI, Model Penal Code § 302.2(1) (Prop. Off. Draft 1962). Similarly, a probationer's failure to make sufficient bona fide efforts to seek employment or borrow money in order to pay the fine or restitution may reflect an insufficient concern for paying the debt he owes to society for his crime. In such a situation, the State is likewise justified in revoking probation and using imprisonment as an appropriate penalty for the offense. But if the probationer has made all reasonable efforts to pay the fine or restitution, and yet cannot do so through no fault of his own,
[9]
it is fundamentally unfair to revoke probation automatically
669
including assessments for certain court investigations. (Gov. Code, § 68631.) Government Code section 68632 grants permission to proceed without paying costs to those receiving certain public assistance benefits, to those whose monthly income is 125 percent or less of government poverty guidelines, and to those who "cannot pay court fees without using moneys that normally would pay for the common necessaries of life for the applicant and the applicant's family." (Gov. Code, § 68632, subds. (a)-(c).)
[2]
While this protective mechanism lessens the disproportionate burden that these fundraising fees present to indigent litigants in the civil context, the Legislature neither instituted nor rejected a corresponding safeguard for assessments attached to a criminal conviction. Both Government Code section 70373 and Penal Code section 1465.8 are silent as to the consideration of a defendant's ability to pay in imposing the assessments.
B.
For Those Unable To Pay, These Assessments Inflict Additional Punishment
The "constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection both call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious discriminations between persons and different groups of persons. Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system—all people charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned, `stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court.'" (
Griffin v. Illinois
(1956) 351 U.S. 12, 17 [100 L.Ed. 891, 76 S.Ct. 585] (
Griffin
)
.)
Accordingly, a state may not inflict punishment on indigent convicted criminal defendants solely on the basis of their poverty. In
In re Antazo
(1970) 3 Cal.3d 100 [89 Cal.Rptr. 255, 473 P.2d 999] (
Antazo
),
the California Supreme Court invalidated the practice of requiring convicted defendants to serve jail time if they were unable to pay a fine and a penalty assessment. (
Id.
at p. 103.) "Although a direction for confinement for default in payment of a fine may appear to apply equally to both the rich offender and the poor one, actually the former has the opportunity to escape his confinement while the right of the latter to pay what he cannot, is a hollow one." (
Id.
at pp. 103-104.) The California Supreme Court observed, "`The "choice" of paying [a] $100 fine or spending 30 days in jail is really no choice at all to the person who cannot raise $100. The resulting imprisonment is no more or
1167
disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or anywise destroyed; nor shall we go upon him nor send upon him, but by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." These pledges were unquestionably steps toward a fairer and more nearly equal application of criminal justice. In this tradition, our own constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection both call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious discriminations between persons and different groups of persons. Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system—all people charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned, "stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court."
Chambers
v.
Florida,
309 U. S. 227, 241
. See also
Yick Wo
v.
Hopkins,
118 U. S. 356, 369
.
[11]
Surely no one would contend that either a State or the Federal Government could constitutionally provide that defendants unable to pay court costs in advance should be denied the right to plead not guilty or to defend themselves in court.
[12]
Such a law would make the constitutional promise of a fair trial a worthless thing. Notice, the right to be heard, and the right to counsel would under such circumstances be meaningless promises to the poor. In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color. Plainly the ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational relationship to a defendant's
18
no less than imprisonment for being poor ...[.]' [Citation.]" (
Id.
at p. 108; see also
id.
at p. 115 ["he was unable to obtain his freedom only because he was poor"].)
[3]
Citing
Antazo, supra,
3 Cal.3d 100,
with approval, the United States Supreme Court has held that the federal Constitution prohibits states from automatically revoking an indigent defendant's probation for failure to pay a fine and restitution. (
Bearden v. Georgia
(1983) 461 U.S. 660, 667-668 [76 L.Ed.2d 221, 103 S.Ct. 2064] (
Bearden
)
["if the State determines a fine or restitution to be the appropriate and adequate penalty for the crime, it may not thereafter imprison a person solely because he lacked the resources to pay it"].) "If the probationer has willfully refused to pay the fine or restitution when he has the means to pay, the State is perfectly justified in using imprisonment as a sanction to enforce collection. [Citation.] ... But if the probationer has made all reasonable efforts to pay the fine or restitution, and yet cannot do so through no fault of his own, it is fundamentally unfair to revoke probation automatically without considering whether adequate alternative methods of punishing the defendant are available. This lack of fault provides a `substantial reaso[n] which justifie[s] or mitigate[s] the violation and make[s] revocation inappropriate.' [Citations.]" (
Id.
at pp. 668-669, fns. omitted.)
Imposing unpayable fines on indigent defendants is not only unfair, it serves no rational purpose, fails to further the legislative intent, and may be counterproductive. A fine on indigent people "is not imposed to further any penal objective of the State. It is imposed to augment the State's revenues but obviously does not serve that purpose; the defendant cannot pay because he is indigent...." (
Tate v. Short
(1971) 401 U.S. 395, 399 [28 L.Ed.2d 130, 91 S.Ct. 668]
; see also
Antazo, supra,
3 Cal.3d 100, 114
.) Poor people must face collection efforts solely because of their financial status, an unfair and unnecessary burden that does not accomplish the goal of collecting money. Punishing "someone who through no fault of his own is unable to make restitution will not make restitution suddenly forthcoming. Indeed, such a policy may have the perverse effect of inducing the probationer to use illegal means to acquire funds to pay in order to avoid" the additional negative consequences. (
Bearden, supra,
461 U.S. at pp. 670-671
.)
The People argue that
Griffin, supra,
351 U.S. 12,
Antazo, supra,
3 Cal.3d 100,
and
Bearden, supra,
461 U.S. 660
are inapposite because while the defendants in those cases faced imprisonment on the basis of their poverty, Dueñas is subject only to a civil judgment that she cannot satisfy. The United
1168
litigation or by offset against nearly any amount owed to the defendant by a state agency, including tax refunds. (Pen. Code, § 1202.43, subd. (b); Gov. Code, §§ 12418, 12419.5.)
"The principle that a punitive award must be considered in light of the defendant's financial condition is ancient." (
Adams v. Murakami
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 113 [284 Cal.Rptr. 318, 813 P.2d 1348]
.) The Magna Carta prohibited civil sanctions that were disproportionate to the offense or that would deprive the wrongdoer of his means of livelihood. (
Adams,
at p. 113.) Yet, although Penal Code section 1202.4 permits the court to waive imposition of a restitution fine if it finds "compelling and extraordinary reasons" why the fine should not be imposed, the statute expressly states that inability to pay the fine does not qualify:
[6]
"A defendant's inability to pay shall not be considered a compelling and extraordinary reason not to impose a restitution fine." (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (c).) This provision is at odds with the policy articulated in Penal Code section 1203.2, subdivision (a): "Restitution shall be consistent with a person's ability to pay."
[7]
As a result of Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (c)'s prohibition on considering the defendant's ability to pay the minimum fine, the criminal justice system punishes indigent defendants in a way that it does not punish wealthy defendants. In most cases, a defendant who has successfully fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period of probation has an absolute statutory right to have the charges against him or her dismissed. (Pen. Code, § 1203.4, subd. (a)(1).) The defendant must be "released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense of which he or she has been convicted," with the exception of driver's license revocation proceedings. (
Ibid.
; see Veh. Code, § 13555.) But if a probationer cannot afford the mandatory restitution fine, through no fault of his or her own he or she is categorically barred from earning the right to have his or her charges dropped and to relief from the penalties and disabilities of the offense for which he or she has been on probation, no matter how completely he or she complies with every other condition of his or her probation. Instead, the indigent probationer must appeal to the discretion of the trial court and must persuade the
1171
As the trial court noted, this matter "doesn't stem from one case for which she's not capable of paying the fines and fees," but from a series of criminal proceedings driven by, and contributing to, Dueñas's poverty. Unable to pay the fees for citations she received when she was a teenager, Dueñas lost her driver's license. Like many who are "faced with the need to navigate the world and no feasible, affordable, and legal option for doing so" (
Thomas v. Haslam
(M.D.Tenn. 2018) 329 F.Supp.3d 475, 521
), she broke the law and continued to drive. As a result, Dueñas now has four misdemeanor convictions for driving without a valid license. These, in turn, have occasioned new fines, fees, and assessments that she is unable to pay. As the trial court described it, the repeat criminal proceedings have caused her financial obligations to "snowball."
[1]
Dueñas argues that laws imposing fines and fees on people too poor to pay punish the poor for their poverty. These statutes, she asserts, are fundamentally unfair because they use the criminal law, which is centrally concerned with identifying and punishing only blameworthy decisions, to punish the blameless failure to pay by a person who cannot pay because of her poverty. The laws, moreover, are irrational: They raise no money because people who cannot pay do not pay. We conclude that due process of law requires the trial court to conduct an ability to pay hearing and ascertain a defendant's present ability to pay before it imposes court facilities and court operations assessments under Penal Code section 1465.8 and Government Code section 70373. We also hold that although Penal Code section 1202.4 bars consideration of a defendant's ability to pay unless the judge is considering increasing the fee over the statutory minimum, the execution of any restitution fine imposed under this statute must be stayed unless and until the trial court holds an ability to pay hearing and concludes that the defendant has the present ability to pay the restitution fine.
I.
The Court Facilities and Court Operations Assessments Must Be Subject to an Ability To Pay Determination
A.
The Statutory Scheme
Government Code section 70373 and Penal Code section 1465.8, which impose court facilities and court operations assessments on every criminal conviction, each provide that the assessment "shall be imposed on every conviction for a criminal offense" except for parking offenses. (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1); Pen. Code, § 1465.8, subd. (a)(1).)
1165
Dueñas's
Analysis Is Fundamentally Flawed
Unlike the majority, I instead would conclude the
Dueñas
decision incorrectly applies California statutes; and in addition, is fundamentally flawed in that general "fairness" grounds of due process and/or equal protection principles do not afford a defendant a preassessment ability-to-pay hearing before a trial court imposes fines and fees on him or her.
First, I believe that in reaching its conclusions,
Dueñas
by judicial fiat inserted language into statutes that did not exist. That is, I note the adjective "present" used by the
Dueñas
court in its ability-to-pay analysis is nowhere to be found in Penal Code sections 1202.4 and 1465.8, or in Government Code section 70373. (See
Dueñas, supra,
30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1164
; but see Pen. Code, § 987.8, subd. (b) [noting if a defendant is provided legal assistance, following the conclusion of criminal proceedings a court "may, after notice and a hearing, make a determination of the
present ability
of the defendant to pay all or a portion of the cost thereof" (italics added)].)
Perhaps more egregiously,
Dueñas
in its analysis completely disregarded unambiguous language in subdivision (c) of section 1202.4 stating that inability to pay cannot be considered when only the statutory minimum is imposed, as was the case there. Moreover, by also adding the word "present" to the ability-to-pay analysis with respect to the restitution fine,
Dueñas
ignored section 1202.4, subdivision (d), which says the exact opposite: "Consideration of a defendant's inability to pay may include his or her
future earning capacity.
" (Italics added.) A court lacks the power to rewrite a statute either so as to make it conform to a presumed intention that is not stated, or to ignore a statute's plain and unambiguous language. (See
People v. Statum
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 682, 692 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 572, 50 P.3d 355]
.)
I would conclude that, to the extent the
Legislature
provided such a right, which in the instant case it did with respect to the restitution fine (see § 1202.4, subds. (b)(1) & (c)) and the sex offender registration fee (see § 290.3, subd. (a)),
[8]
a defendant's failure to avail himself or herself of that
statutory
relief constituted a forfeiture under the "traditional" rule (
Frandsen, supra,
33 Cal.App.5th at p. 1155
).
Second, with regard to the application of general due process and equal protection principles, the heavy reliance
Dueñas
places on
Griffin
was, in my
1039
view, misplaced.
Griffin
involved the issue of court
access.
Specifically, that case concluded that due process and equal protection guaranteed an indigent criminal defendant a free transcript of trial proceedings in order to provide that defendant with
access
to a court of review, where he would receive an adequate and effective examination of his criminal conviction. (
Griffin, supra,
351 U.S. at p. 16
.)
I, for one, do not believe the imposition of the two assessments and one restitution fine on the defendant in
Dueñas
is an issue of access to our courts or justice system, as was the case in
Griffin
and similar authorities.
[9]
Nor do I believe the fines or fees imposed on the defendant in
Dueñas
satisfied the traditional due process definition of a taking of life, liberty or property.
Likewise,
Dueñas
's citations to multiple provisions of the Government Code do not support its conclusion that our "Legislature has recognized the deleterious impact of increased court fees on indigent people." (
Dueñas, supra,
30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1165
.) In my view, these statutes instead ensure that all people, without regard to economic status, have equal access to our justice system. Again, in my opinion the imposition of the two assessments and one restitution fine on the defendant in
Dueñas
was not an issue of
access
to the courts or our system of justice.
In sum, I find no general due process and equal protection authority which
requires
a court to conduct a
preassessment present ability-to-pay
hearing before imposing any fine or fee on a defendant, as
Dueñas
seems to conclude. On a practical note, it takes little imagination to envision the potential expansion of the holding of
Dueñas
to a multitude of other fines or fees that were not the subject of that case, or the instant case. One such possible fine is victim restitution, which is encompassed in subdivision (f) of section 1202.4—one of the same statutes at issue in
Dueñas.
Although that subdivision expressly requires a court to order "full restitution" to the victim, should the constitutional basis of
Dueñas
stand, any restitution hearing might require a finding of
present ability
to pay victim restitution.
1040
Finally, I would further conclude relief from fines or fees based on inability to pay is more properly analyzed under the Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive fines, fees, and punishment, which analysis I turn to next.
The Excessive Fines Clause
Rejection of the due process and equal protection analysis of
Dueñas
does not leave parties without recourse if they believe a statutory assessment of fines, fees, and punishment amounts to a constitutional violation as written or applied.
To the extent defendant in the instant case claimed poverty is the "only reason [he] cannot pay the fine[s] and fees," as was the case in
Dueñas
(
Dueñas, supra,
30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1160
), I would analyze that claim under the excessive fines clauses of both the Eighth Amendment,
[10]
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, as recently announced by the United Supreme Court in
Timbs v. Indiana
(2019) 586 U.S. ___ [203 L.Ed.2d 11, 139 S.Ct. 682]
, as well as article I, section 17, of our state Constitution.
[11]
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of excessive fines. The word "fine," as used in that provision, has been interpreted to be "`a payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense.'" (
United States v. Bajakajian
(1998) 524 U.S. 321, 327-328 [141 L.Ed.2d 314, 118 S.Ct. 2028] (
Bajakajian
)
.) A fine is excessive for purposes of the Eighth Amendment "if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense." (
Bajakajian,
at p. 334.)
Briefly, in
Bajakajian
the defendant attempted to take $357,144 out of the country, in contravention of federal law requiring any person transporting more than $10,000 out of the United States to file a report with the appropriate government agency. The government in
Bajakajian
claimed that the entire $357,144 was forfeited. (
Bajakajian, supra,
524 U.S. at p. 325
.)
The high court in
Bajakajian
pointed out that "[t]he touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality...." (
Bajakajian, supra,
524 U.S. at p. 334
.) As found by our own high court,
Bajakajian
"then set out four considerations: (1) the defendant's culpability; (2) the relationship between the harm and the penalty; (3) the penalties imposed in similar statutes; and (4) the defendant's
1041
Of course,
Dueñas
's expansion of the boundaries of due process is not in itself problematic. But any such expansion warrants due consideration and reflection. So, we ask: Is
Dueñas
's expansion of due process in a manner that grants criminal defendants a protection not conferred by either its foundational pillars a correct interpretation?
In our view, it is not. We reach this conclusion for two reasons.
First,
Dueñas
does more than go beyond its foundations; it announces a principle inconsistent with them. Our Supreme Court in
Antazo, supra,
3 Cal.3d 100,
expressly declined to "hold that the imposition upon an indigent offender of a fine [or] penalty assessment, either as a sentence or as a condition of probation, constitutes of necessity in all instances a violation of the equal protection clause." (
Id.
at pp. 116, 103-104.)
Antazo
refused to prohibit the imposition of fines and assessments upon indigent defendants for good reason, which the United States Supreme Court explained best: "The State . . . has a fundamental interest in appropriately punishing persons—rich and poor—who violate its criminal laws," such that "[a] defendant's poverty in no way immunizes him from punishment." (
Bearden, supra,
461 U.S. at pp. 669-670
.) To confer such an immunity, that court has said, "would amount to inverse discrimination [because] it would enable an indigent [defendant] to avoid both the fine and imprisonment for nonpayment whereas other defendants must always suffer one or the other . . . ." (
Williams, supra,
399 U.S. at p. 244
.) By adopting an across-the-board prohibition on the very imposition of assessments and fines on indigent defendants,
Dueñas
prohibits a practice that
Antazo
sanctioned (albeit under a different constitutional provision). What is more,
Dueñas
mandates the very type of "inverse discrimination" condemned by the court in both
Bearden
and
Williams.
Second,
Dueñas
is inconsistent with the purposes and operation of probation. The chief purpose of probation is to "`rehabilitat[e]'" and "reintegrat[e]. . . [a] [defendant] into the community." (
People v. Moran
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 407 [205 Cal.Rptr.3d 491, 376 P.3d 617]
; § 1202.7.) One way to achieve this purpose is to require the defendant-probationer to make an effort to repay his debt to society. This is why our Legislature has specifically empowered trial courts to "require[,] as a condition of probation[,] that [a] probationer go to work and earn money" in order "to pay any fine imposed or reparation condition." (§ 1203.1, subd. (d).) And it is why the constitutional prohibition against incarcerating a defendant for the inability to pay criminal penalties due solely to his indigence does not prohibit "revoking probation and using imprisonment as an appropriate penalty" when a probationer has "fail[ed] to make sufficient bona fide efforts to seek employment or borrow money in order to pay the fine or restitution." (
Bearden, supra,
461 U.S. at p. 668
.)
Dueñas
impedes the purpose of probation because it prohibits the
328
B.
Is
Dueñas
good law?
Dueñas
engaged in a bit of constitutional synergy in fashioning what its authoring court acknowledged was a "newly announced constitutional principle" (
People v. Castellano
(2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485, 489 [245 Cal.Rptr.3d 138]
) from two components—that is, the two strands of due process precedent described above—that themselves do not dictate
Dueñas
's rule.
The first strand does not dictate
Dueñas'
s bar on imposing fees because the imposition of assessments, fines and fees does not deny a criminal defendant access to the courts. (Accord,
People v. Gutierrez
(2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1039 [247 Cal.Rptr.3d 850] (conc. opn. of Benke, J.) (
Gutierrez
)
["the imposition of" assessments and fine "on the defendant in
Dueñas
" is not "an issue of access to our courts or justice system"];
People v. Santos
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 923, 937 [___ Cal.Rptr.3d ___] (dis. opn. of Elia, J.) (
Santos
)
["
Dueñas
did not involve fines or fees required to be paid in order to access judicial processes."].) The cases requiring the removal of financial bars to access are keyed to ensuring that the litigant has a full and fair opportunity to present the
merits
of his or her claims at trial and on appeal. (
Jameson, supra,
5 Cal.5th at p. 608
["lack of a verbatim record . . . will frequently be fatal to [the] litigant's ability to have his or her claims of trial court error resolved
on the merits
by an appellate court" (italics added)];
Mayer, supra,
404 U.S. at p. 198
[denial of record denies "proper consideration of [defendant's] claims"].) In this regard, access is part and parcel of the "opportunity to be heard" that the constitutional right of due process is meant to secure. (
Today's Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 212 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 358, 303 P.3d 1140]
.) In this case, the imposition of the assessments, fine and fee in no way interfered with defendant's right to present a defense at trial or to challenge the trial court's rulings on appeal; indeed, their imposition came
after
the trial was over and, except for the bare fact of their imposition, is not otherwise challenged on appeal.
The second strand also does not dictate
Dueñas
's bar on imposing fees because their imposition, without more, does not result in incarceration for nonpayment due to indigence. The cases prohibiting incarceration for indigence alone rest on the notion that "[
f
]
reedom from imprisonment
. . . lies at the heart of the liberty that [the due process] [c]lause protects." (
Zadvydas v. Davis
(2001) 533 U.S. 678, 690 [150 L.Ed.2d 653, 121 S.Ct. 2491]
, italics added.) The act of imposing an assessment, fine or fee upon a criminal defendant at the time of sentencing does not mandate instant incarceration and thus does not infringe that very fundamental liberty interest. (Accord,
Santos, supra,
38 Cal.App.5th at p. 938 (dis. opn. of Elia, J.)
["the statutes at issue . . . in
Dueñas
deprive no one of [their] fundamental right to liberty based on [their] indigence."].)
327
39 Cal.App.5th 771 (2019)
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
RICHARD ANTHONY EVANS, Defendant and Appellant.
No. A154841.
Court of Appeals of California, First District, Division Four.
September 6, 2019.
Appeal from the Superior Court of Solano County, No. FCR319582, Carlos R. Gutierrez, Judge.
773
prohibits courts from considering a defendant's ability to pay in determining the amount of the restitution order. (§ 1202.4, subd. (g).)
The parties have not cited any cases extending the rule of
Dueñas
to victim restitution under section 1202.4, subdivision (f), and our own research has disclosed none. Case law does make clear that the purposes of the assessments and fine considered in
Dueñas
are different from the primary purpose of victim restitution. (
People v. Holman
(2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1451 [155 Cal.Rptr.3d 164] (
Holman
)
[comparing purposes of restitution fines and victim restitution].) As
Dueñas
explains, the court facilities and court operations assessments are intended to maintain funding for California courts. (
Dueñas, supra,
30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1165
; see
People v. Alford
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 757-758 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 310, 171 P.3d 32]
[§ 1465.8];
People v. Fleury
(2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1492 [106 Cal.Rptr.3d 722]
[Gov. Code, § 70373].) A restitution fine is intended to be additional punishment for a crime. (
Dueñas,
at p. 1169;
Holman,
at p. 1451;
People v. Hanson
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 355, 362 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 58, 1 P.3d 650]
.)
The purpose of victim restitution, on the other hand, is neither to raise funds nor to punish a defendant; it "is to reimburse the victim for economic losses caused by the defendant's criminal conduct, i.e., to make the victim reasonably whole." (
Holman, supra,
214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1451
.) Section 1202.4 implements the state constitutional mandate that "all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have the right to seek and secure restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes causing the losses they suffer." (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A);
Giordano, supra,
42 Cal.4th at p. 652
;
People v. Mearns
(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 498 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 511]
.) While a victim restitution order may also serve the purposes of rehabilitation and deterrence (
People v. Bernal
(2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 155, 161-162 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 622]
;
People v. Moser
(1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 130, 135-136 [57 Cal.Rptr.2d 647]
), its measure is the harm suffered by crime victims and its primary effect is to compensate those victims. This effect is reinforced by the requirement that all moneys collected from a defendant be first applied to victim restitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(C).)
Based on the significant differences in purpose and effect between victim restitution and the moneys at issue in
Dueñas,
we decline to extend the rule of
Dueñas
to victim restitution. In a civil action for compensatory damages, a defendant's wealth is irrelevant to liability. (
Las Palmas Associates v. Las Palmas Center Associates
(1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1220, 1242-1243 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 301]
.) We conclude similarly that a defendant's ability to pay victim restitution is not a proper factor to consider in setting a restitution award under section 1202.4, subdivision (f).
778
Cal.Rptr.3d 723, 79 P.3d 1030]
.) A challenged sentence falls within the "unauthorized sentence" exception (to the general rule that a specific objection to a sentencing error is required) when it "could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case," such that it is "`clear and correctable' independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing." (
Scott,
at p. 354.) The claim presented by the People in this case is just such a claim.
The prosecutor's objection at the hearing was thus sufficient to preserve for appeal the issue that the trial court erred in entering its order suspending, dismissing, or otherwise disposing of the restitution fine and, in any case, the claim may be characterized as a species of unauthorized sentence, as to which no objection was required.
We next examine the merits of the statutory claim.
III. The Trial Court Could Properly Suspend or Dismiss the Restitution Fines in the Context of Drug Court Early Termination of Probation
A.
Background of the Law Concerning Victim Restitution and Restitution Fines
1.
Legislative History: Victims' Bill of Rights
(3) In June 1982, the electorate passed Proposition 8, known as "The Victims' Bill of Rights." Among other things, Proposition 8 declared a state constitutional right of crime victims to restitution from those persons convicted of crimes, which crimes caused losses to the victims. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A).) In response to the new constitutional provisions, the Legislature amended some old statutes and enacted new ones to implement the right to restitution. (See
People v. Giordano
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 652 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 170 P.3d 623]
.)
The statutes recognize two kinds of restitution: (1) restitution fines (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (b)), which are not directly related to the amount of loss sustained by a victim, and (2) direct restitution to the victim (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f)), which is based on the amount of the loss the victim actually sustained. The purposes of the two kinds of restitution are different. The imposition of a restitution fine is punishment. (See
People v. Kunitz
(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 652, 656 [18 Cal.Rptr.3d 843]
.) The purpose of direct victim restitution, however, is to reimburse the victim for economic losses caused by the defendant's criminal conduct, i.e., to make the victim reasonably whole. (
People v. Taylor
(2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 757, 763 [128
1452
We are not persuaded otherwise by the fact that in this case, the victims have already received compensation through the California Victim Compensation Board. As explained in
Holman,
"[t]he Restitution Fund is in the State Treasury Department, and is used to compensate victims for certain kinds of `pecuniary losses they suffer as a direct result of criminal acts.' (Gov. Code, § 13950, subd. (a).) Crime victims may apply to the Restitution Fund as one avenue to recover monetary losses caused by criminal conduct." (
Holman, supra,
214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1452,
citing § 1202.4, subd. (f)(2).) Then, "when direct victim restitution has been satisfied by the victim's application to the victim compensation program, the amounts a defendant is ordered to pay as direct victim restitution are instead paid to the Restitution Fund." (
Holman,
at p. 1452.) We see no reason that defendant should receive a windfall—and the Restitution Fund should suffer a loss—simply because the victims exercised their right to apply to the California Victim Compensation Board rather than waiting for the victim restitution order.
III. DISPOSITION
The restitution order is affirmed.
Streeter, Acting P. J., and Brown, J., concurred.
[*]
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts II.A. and II.B.
[1]
All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
[*]
See footnote,
ante,
page 771.
[2]
Subsequent cases have suggested that the proper analytic framework for evaluating the constitutionality of punitive fines, such as restitution fines under section 1202.4, subdivision (b), is the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, rather than the due process clause. (See
People v. Kopp
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, 96-97 [___ Cal.Rptr.3d ___] (
Kopp
)
;
People v. Gutierrez
(2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1034 [247 Cal.Rptr.3d 850] (conc. opn. of Benke, Acting P. J
.).) Other cases have walked back some of the language in
Dueñas,
holding that it is the defendant's burden to prove inability to pay, rather than the prosecutor's burden to come forward with contrary evidence, and that future earnings can be considered, along with a defendant's present ability to pay. (
People v. Santos
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 923, 933
-934 Cal.Rptr.3d];
Kopp,
at p. 96;
People v. Castellano
(2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485, 490 [245 Cal.Rptr.3d 138]
[same division that decided
Dueñas
ruled that court may consider potential prison pay in determining ability to pay]; see § 2085.5 [restitution balance collected from prison wages].)
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38 Cal.App.5th 47 (2019)
250 Cal.Rptr.3d 852
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CHRISTI J. KOPP et al., Defendants and Appellants.
No. D072464.
Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division One.
July 31, 2019.
APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Super. Ct. No. SCN327213, Harry M. Elias, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded with directions.
Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Christi J. Kopp.
Rebecca P. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Jason Samuel Hernandez.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina, Melissa Mandel and Adrian R. Contreras, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
raised the issue below. Thus, an ability to pay hearing for these assessments as to Appellants is warranted on remand.
Nevertheless, as we are not wholly endorsing
Dueñas, supra,
30 Cal.App.5th 1157,
we want to make clear that it is Appellants' burden to make a record below as to their ability to pay these assessments. To the extent the
Dueñas
court implies that it is the prosecution's burden to prove that a defendant can pay an assessment (see
id.
at p. 1172), we disagree. It is the defendant who bears the burden of proving an inability to pay. (Cf.
People v. McMahan
(1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 740, 749 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 708]
.) In addition, the
Dueñas
court suggests that the trial court must evaluate a defendant's
present
ability to pay any fees or fines. (See
Dueñas,
at p. 1164.) The court, however, does not define what is meant by "present." To avoid confusion, we make clear that the trial court should not limit itself to considering only whether Appellants have the ability to pay at the time of the sentencing hearing. As both Appellants will be serving lengthy prison sentences, it is appropriate for the court to consider the wages that both may earn in prison. (See
People v. Hennessey
(1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1830, 1837 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 792]
[ability to pay includes a defendant's ability to obtain prison wages]; § 2085.5 [outlining how a restitution fine balance may be collected from prison wages].)
Additionally, we do not follow the court's approach to restitution fines in
Dueñas.
There, the court acknowledged that the restitution fine under section 1202.4 is "additional punishment for a crime." (
Dueñas, supra,
30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1169
.) Yet, the court still focused solely on a defendant's ability to pay in determining whether such a punitive fine is constitutional. To this end, the court held: "[A]lthough Penal Code section 1202.4 bars consideration of a defendant's ability to pay unless the judge is considering increasing the fee over the statutory minimum, the execution of any restitution fine imposed under this statute must be stayed unless and until the trial court holds an ability to pay hearing and concludes that the defendant has the present ability to pay the restitution fine." (
Dueñas, supra,
30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1164
.) We disagree that this approach should apply to all punitive fines in the first instance.
[24]
Instead, because these fines are intended to punish defendants, we agree with the People that a defendant should challenge such fines under the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment of the federal Constitution and article I, section 17 of the California Constitution. Put differently, there is no due process requirement that the court hold an ability
97
to pay hearing before imposing a punitive fine and only impose the fine if it determines the defendant can afford to pay it.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." "[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution ... makes the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments applicable to the States. [Citation.] The Due Process Clause of its own force also prohibits the States from imposing `grossly excessive' punishments...." (
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.
(2001) 532 U.S. 424, 433-434 [149 L.Ed.2d 674, 121 S.Ct. 1678]
.)
The California Constitution contains similar protections. Article I, section 17, prohibits "cruel or unusual punishment" and "excessive fines"; article I, section 7, prohibits the taking of property "without due process of law."
The seminal United States Supreme Court case on the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of excessive fines is
United States v. Bajakajian
(1998) 524 U.S. 321 [141 L.Ed.2d 314, 118 S.Ct. 2028] (
Bajakajian
)
, which involved a federal statute (31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)) requiring any person transporting more than $10,000 out of the United States to file a report with the United States Customs Service. The defendant attempted to take $357,144 out of the country without filing a report. The government claimed that the entire $357,144 was forfeited. The high court pointed out that "[t]he touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality." (
Bajakajian,
at p. 334.) It then set out four considerations: (1) the defendant's culpability; (2) the relationship between the harm and the penalty; (3) the penalties imposed in similar statutes; and (4) the defendant's ability to pay. (
Id.
at pp. 337-338.) After reviewing those considerations, the high court held that the forfeiture of the defendant's currency constituted an "excessive fine" barred by the Eighth Amendment.
The California Supreme Court has adopted the same four factors to analyze whether a fine is constitutionally disproportionate. (See
People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 707, 728 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 814, 124 P.3d 408]
.) These are the same four factors the superior court should apply if either appellant claims the punitive fines here are excessive. And, as both the United States and California Supreme Courts have held, a defendant's ability to pay is one factor to consider. (
Ibid.
;
Bajakajian, supra,
524 U.S. at p. 338
; cf. § 1202.4, subd. (c) ["Inability to pay may be considered only in increasing the amount of the restitution fine in
98
the excessiveness of a punitive forfeiture involves solely a proportionality determination. See
infra
this page and 335-337.
[9]
III
Because the forfeiture of respondent's currency constitutes punishment and is thus a "fine" within the meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause, we now turn to the question whether it is "excessive."
A
The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish. See
Austin
v.
United States,
509 U. S., at 622-623
(noting Court of Appeals' statement that "`the government is exacting too high a penalty in relation to the offense committed' ");
Alexander
v.
United States,
509 U. S. 544, 559 (1993)
("It is in the light of the extensive criminal activities which petitioner apparently conducted . . . that the question whether the forfeiture was `excessive' must be considered"). Until today, however, we have not articulated a standard for determining whether a punitive forfeiture is constitutionally excessive. We now hold that a punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense.
335
of the forfeiture to the gravity of the defendant's offense. If the amount of the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the defendant's offense, it is unconstitutional.
B
Under this standard, the forfeiture of respondent's entire $357,144 would violate the Excessive Fines Clause.
[11]
Respondent's crime was solely a reporting offense. It was permissible to transport the currency out of the country so long as he reported it. Section 982(a)(1) orders currency to be forfeited for a "willful" violation of the reporting requirement. Thus, the essence of respondent's crime is a willful failure to report the removal of currency from the United States.
[12]
Furthermore, as the District Court found, respondent's
338
36 Cal.Rptr.3d 814 (2005)
37 Cal.4th 707
124 P.3d 408
The PEOPLE ex rel. Bill LOCKYER, as Attorney General, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.
No. S121009.
Supreme Court of California.
December 22, 2005.
815
excess of the minimum fine pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) [of section 1202.4]"].) However, it is not the only factor.
[25]
DISPOSITION
Appellants' respective convictions under count 4 are reversed. We remand this matter to the superior court to hold an ability to pay hearing and resentence Appellants consistent with this opinion and amend the abstracts of judgment accordingly. As part of resentencing, Hernandez may move under Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) to strike his prior serious felony conviction. In addition, Appellants may challenge their punitive fines under the California and federal constitutions as set forth in this opinion. We offer no opinion regarding how the superior court should rule on these matters. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
Guerrero, J., concurred.
BENKE, Acting P. J., Concurring and Dissenting.—
I agree with the majority that, despite defendant Christi J. Kopp's failure at sentencing to object on the ground of inability to pay the various fines and assessments imposed by the trial court, her claim of error has been preserved on appeal as a result of the inability-to-pay objection made by codefendant Jason Samuel Hernandez. (See
People v. Hill
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673]
[noting a "defendant will be excused from the necessity of either a timely objection and/or a request for admonition if either would be futile"].)
However, I part company with the majority's disposition of this case. Unlike the majority, I do not agree that remand for an inability-to-pay hearing should be based in part on due process and equal protection grounds as stated in
People v. Dueñas
(2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 [242 Cal.Rptr.3d 268] (
Dueñas
)
, including for certain fines and/or assessments, but not others. Although the majority urges "caution" in following
Dueñas
based on the "extreme facts" of that case (maj. opn.
ante,
at p. 94), the majority in remanding this case for such a hearing at the same time expressly agrees "to some extent" with
Dueñas
in concluding that "due process requires the trial court to conduct an ability to pay hearing and ascertain a defendant's ability to pay before it imposes" various assessments on a defendant. (Maj. opn.
ante,
at p. 95.)
99
C. Analysis
"There is good reason to be concerned that fines, uniquely of all punishments, will be imposed in a measure out of accord with the penal goals of retribution and deterrence.... [Because] fines are a source of revenue ..., it makes sense to scrutinize governmental action more closely when the State stands to benefit."
[9]
While we do not join the courts that have declared
Dueñas
to have been wrongly decided, we do agree with an insight put forward in some of the opinions taking that position. A suitable framework for analyzing the constitutionality of the restitution fine imposed here, as well as the assessments, in our view, is the excessive fines prohibition in the Eighth Amendment and its counterpart under the California Constitution, article I, section 17. (E.g.,
Gutierrez, supra,
35 Cal.App.5th at p. 1040 (conc. opn. of Benke, Acting P. J
.);
Kopp, supra,
38 Cal.App.5th at p. 99
(conc. & dis. opn. of Benke, Acting P. J.).)
[10]
An excessive fines analysis "allows for a consistent and fair review of fines and fees imposed on individuals [while they are focused both legally and factually in the trial court], with the appeal process remaining available for further review." (
Kopp, supra,
at p. 100
(conc. & dis. opn. of Benke, Acting P. J.).)
[11]
1.
The Restitution Fine and the Assessments All Qualify as "Fines" for Purposes of the Eighth Amendment and Article I, Section 17 of the California Constitution
Underlying the Attorney General's position on Cowan's ability-to-pay objection is the implicit premise that the restitution fine is subject to scrutiny as an Eighth Amendment "fine," while the assessments are nonpunitive and therefore do not fall within the ambit of federal or state constitutional prohibitions on excessive fines. We do not agree with that premise. Taking the analysis a step further than that of the
Kopp
majority or Justice Benke in her separate opinions in
Gutierrez
and
Kopp,
we believe that all of the monetary exactions at issue here must be treated as punitive in nature and thus may be analyzed as "fines" for purposes of the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17 of the California Constitution. (
Aviles, supra,
39 Cal.App.5th at p. 1071
;
Cota, supra,
45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 800-801
(conc. & dis. opn. of Dato, J.).)
"`[T]he method' courts use to determine `what constitutes punishment varies depending upon the context in which the question arises.'" (
People v. Ruiz
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100, 1108 [232 Cal.Rptr.3d 714, 417 P.3d 191]
, quoting
People v. Castellanos
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 785, 795 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346, 982 P.2d 211] (plur. opn. of George, C. J
.) (plur. opn.) (
Castellanos
).) The conventional approach, which applies in double jeopardy and ex post facto cases, proceeds in two steps. (
United States v. Ward
(1980) 448 U.S. 242, 248-249 [65 L.Ed.2d 742, 100 S.Ct. 2636]
.) We look initially to "whether the Legislature intended the provision to constitute punishment" and we go no further if that intent is plain from the face of the statute or the legislative history. (
Castellanos, supra,
at p. 795
(plur. opn. of George, C. J.); see
Alford, supra,
42 Cal.4th at p. 755
.) If, on the other hand, "`the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive,'" we look further to "`whether the statutory scheme is "`so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention' to deem it `civil'"'" (
Alford, supra,
at p. 755
) under the multifactor test in
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
(1963) 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 [9 L.Ed.2d 644, 83 S.Ct. 554] (
Mendoza-Martinez
),
which sets forth seven "`useful guideposts.'" (
Castellanos, supra,
at p. 802
44
448 U.S. 242 (1980)
UNITED STATES
v.
WARD, DBA L. O. WARD OIL & GAS OPERATIONS.
No. 79-394.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued February 26, 1980.
Decided June 27, 1980.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT.
243
372 U.S. 144 (1963)
KENNEDY, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
v.
MENDOZA-MARTINEZ.
No. 2.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued October 10-11, 1961.
Restored to the calendar for reargument April 2, 1962.
Reargued December 4, 1962.
Decided February 18, 1963.
[*]
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.
145
(conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).)
[12]
Under this approach, "`we ordinarily defer to the legislature's stated intent'" (
Castellanos, supra,
at p. 795
(plur. opn. of George, C. J.)), and "`"only the clearest proof" will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.' [Citations]." (
Id.
at p. 802 (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).)
If we were to apply this two-step
Ward/Mendoza-Martinez
analytical paradigm, the Attorney General's bifurcated analysis of the restitution fine and the assessments might be warranted. Because the charge imposed under Penal Code section 1202.4 is denominated a "fine" and is levied only on convicted criminals, there would be no need to go beyond the face of the statute to justify the conclusion that the Legislature intended restitution fines to be punitive in nature.
[13]
By contrast for the assessments, the phrases "court operations assessment" and "court facilities assessment" signal an intent to raise revenue for the courts, and the legislative history confirms that objective.
[14]
Even granting that there may be some ambiguity because the assessments are imposed only on criminal convictions, we cannot say by "`"the clearest proof" that "the [assessments are] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the Legislature's] intention" to deem [them] "civil."'" (
Castellanos, supra,
21 Cal.4th at p. 795 (plur. opn. of George, C. J
.).)
But a different approach is called for in the context of excessive fines. The Eighth Amendment's "protection against excessive fines guards against abuses of government's punitive or criminal-law-enforcement authority," and applies to civil and criminal penalties alike. (
Timbs, supra,
586 U.S. at p.
___ [139 S.Ct. at p. 686]; see
Austin v. United States
(1993) 509 U.S. 602, 610 [125 L.Ed.2d 488, 113 S.Ct. 2801] (
Austin
)
.) Because monetary "sanctions frequently serve more than one purpose" (
ibid.
) and have "multiple effects" (
People v. Ruiz, supra,
4 Cal.5th at p. 1108
),
Austin
announced a test for identifying an Eighth Amendment "fine" that is both simpler and broader than the more complex
Ward/Mendoza-Martinez
approach. Under
Austin,
because
45
509 U.S. 602 (1993)
AUSTIN
v.
UNITED STATES
No. 92-6073.
United States Supreme Court.
Argued April 20, 1993.
Decided June 28, 1993.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
603
There, the high court upheld a lower court's refusal to impose a $357,144 forfeiture for the federal offense of taking more than $10,000 in currency through customs without reporting it. (
Id.
at p. 324.) Concluding that the amount of the forfeiture sought by the government was grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense and the harm that it caused, the court found that the amount of the proposed forfeiture would violate the Eighth Amendment. (
Bajakajian, supra,
at pp. 324, 337-340
.)
What is most salient about
Bajakajian,
in our view, is something the Supreme Court did not address. In a footnote, the court left open the question whether "wealth or income are relevant to the proportionality determination" or whether a deprivation of one's livelihood may bear on the Eighth Amendment excessiveness analysis. (
Bajakajian, supra,
524 U.S. at p. 340, fn. 15
.) Federal circuit courts have divided on this question. Some have held that ability to pay is relevant, either as part of a proportionality inquiry (e.g.,
United States v. Viloski
(2d Cir. 2016) 814 F.3d 104, 111 (
Viloski
)
)
[15]
or in addition to it (
United States v. Levesque
(1st Cir. 2008) 546 F.3d 78, 83-85 (
Levesque
)
). And others have held ability to pay has no bearing on the
Bajakajian
analysis (e.g.,
United States v. Dubose
(9th Cir. 1998) 146 F.3d 1141, 1145-1146
),
[16]
with most arriving at that conclusion in the context of forfeiture orders, where the issue of ability to pay is often irrelevant in any event because the issue there generally is confiscation of identified assets rather than imposition of a monetary sanction.
How the high court will resolve the relevance of ability to pay in Eighth Amendment excessive fines analysis remains to be seen. Although we find notable a passing observation in
Timbs
that the excessive fines clause traces its "venerable lineage" back to the Magna Carta, which safeguarded the "`contenement'" of Englishmen and "required that economic sanctions ... `not be so large as to deprive [an offender] of his livelihood'" (
Timbs, supra,
586 U.S. at p.
___ [139 S.Ct. at pp. 687-688]),
[17]
we need not take the discussion of this background point in
Timbs
as a prediction of what the high
47
There, the high court upheld a lower court's refusal to impose a $357,144 forfeiture for the federal offense of taking more than $10,000 in currency through customs without reporting it. (
Id.
at p. 324.) Concluding that the amount of the forfeiture sought by the government was grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense and the harm that it caused, the court found that the amount of the proposed forfeiture would violate the Eighth Amendment. (
Bajakajian, supra,
at pp. 324, 337-340
.)
What is most salient about
Bajakajian,
in our view, is something the Supreme Court did not address. In a footnote, the court left open the question whether "wealth or income are relevant to the proportionality determination" or whether a deprivation of one's livelihood may bear on the Eighth Amendment excessiveness analysis. (
Bajakajian, supra,
524 U.S. at p. 340, fn. 15
.) Federal circuit courts have divided on this question. Some have held that ability to pay is relevant, either as part of a proportionality inquiry (e.g.,
United States v. Viloski
(2d Cir. 2016) 814 F.3d 104, 111 (
Viloski
)
)
[15]
or in addition to it (
United States v. Levesque
(1st Cir. 2008) 546 F.3d 78, 83-85 (
Levesque
)
). And others have held ability to pay has no bearing on the
Bajakajian
analysis (e.g.,
United States v. Dubose
(9th Cir. 1998) 146 F.3d 1141, 1145-1146
),
[16]
with most arriving at that conclusion in the context of forfeiture orders, where the issue of ability to pay is often irrelevant in any event because the issue there generally is confiscation of identified assets rather than imposition of a monetary sanction.
How the high court will resolve the relevance of ability to pay in Eighth Amendment excessive fines analysis remains to be seen. Although we find notable a passing observation in
Timbs
that the excessive fines clause traces its "venerable lineage" back to the Magna Carta, which safeguarded the "`contenement'" of Englishmen and "required that economic sanctions ... `not be so large as to deprive [an offender] of his livelihood'" (
Timbs, supra,
586 U.S. at p.
___ [139 S.Ct. at pp. 687-688]),
[17]
we need not take the discussion of this background point in
Timbs
as a prediction of what the high
47
gravity of his offense.
[15]
It is larger than the $5,000 fine imposed by the District Court by many orders of magnitude, and it bears no articulable correlation to any injury suffered by the Government.
C
Finally, we must reject the contention that the proportionality of full forfeiture is demonstrated by the fact that the First Congress enacted statutes requiring full forfeiture of goods involved in customs offenses or the payment of monetary penalties proportioned to the goods' value. It is argued that the enactment of these statutes at roughly the same time that the Eighth Amendment was ratified suggests that full forfeiture, in the customs context at least, is a proportional punishment. The early customs statutes, however, do not support such a conclusion because, unlike § 982(a)(1), the type of forfeiture that they imposed was not considered punishment for a criminal offense.
Certain of the early customs statutes required the forfeiture of goods imported in violation of the customs laws, and, in some instances, the vessels carrying them as well. See
, e. g.,
Act of Aug. 4, 1790, § 27, 1 Stat. 163 (goods unladen without a permit from the collector). These forfeitures, however, were civil
in rem
forfeitures, in which the Government proceeded against the property itself on the theory that it was guilty, not against a criminal defendant. See,
e. g.,
Harford
v.
United States,
8 Cranch 109 (1814)
(goods unladen without a permit);
Locke
v.
United States,
7 Cranch 339, 340 (1813)
(same). Such forfeitures sought to vindicate the Government's underlying property right in customs duties, and like other traditional
in rem
forfeitures, they were not considered at the founding to be punishment for an offense. See
supra,
at 330-331. They therefore indicate
341
expansive view that ability to pay is relevant to excessiveness under
Bajakajian.
(
Sainez, supra,
77 Cal.App.4th at p. 1322
.)
[19]
It is apparent from
Lockyer
that California courts, borrowing from a line of federal circuit cases, have adopted a broad reading of
Bajakajian
in which ability to pay must be taken into account as a factor bearing on proportionality. "The critical question is whether a defendant's ability to pay is appropriately considered in determining whether there are constitutional limitations on the amounts of fines and fees imposed. If it is, [Cowan] should be afforded a hearing at which he can attempt to make his case." (
Cota, supra,
45 Cal.App.5th at p. 799
(conc. & dis. opn. of Dato, J.).) We think it is. Because ability to pay is an element of the excessive fines calculus under both the federal and state Constitutions, we conclude that a sentencing court may not impose court operations or facilities assessments or restitution fines without giving the defendant, on request, an opportunity to present evidence and argument why such monetary exactions exceed his ability to pay.
"Ordinarily a reviewing court, having examined the relevant considerations, can decide for itself whether a fine or penalty is unconstitutionally excessive" (
Lockyer, supra,
37 Cal.4th at p. 731
), but where a defendant's excessive fine objection raises factual questions, a remand is required so that the trial court can make the necessary findings as a predicate to the excessiveness determination and weigh the relevant factors in the first instance. (
Ibid.
) Here, it must be borne in mind that "[p]roportionality is likely to be the most important issue in a forfeiture case, since the claimant-defendant is able to pay by forfeiting the disputed asset." (
Hines, supra,
88 F.3d at p. 664
.) "In imposing a fine, on the other hand, ability to pay becomes a critical factor." (
Ibid.
)
[20]
Making an ability-to-pay record in the trial court need not entail a contested evidentiary hearing in every case. It can
49
If Congress had intended, by § 523(a)(7) or by any other provision, to discharge state criminal sentences, "we can be certain that there would have been hearings, testimony, and debate concerning consequences so wasteful, so inimical to purposes previously deemed important, and so likely to arouse public outrage,"
TVA
v.
Hill,
437 U. S. 153, 209 (1978) (POWELL, J., dissenting)
.
Our reading of § 523(a)(7) differs from that of the Second Circuit. On its face, it creates a broad exception for all penal sanctions, whether they be denominated fines, penalties, or forfeitures. Congress included two qualifying phrases; the fines must be both "to and for the benefit of a governmental unit," and "not compensation for actual pecuniary loss." Section 523(a)(7) protects traditional criminal fines; it codifies the judicially created exception to discharge for fines. We must decide whether the result is altered by the two major differences between restitution and a traditional fine. Unlike
52
sentences, including restitution orders," and that the "right to formulate and enforce penal sanctions is an important aspect of the sovereignty retained by the States." (
Id.,
at pp. 46, 47 [93 L.Ed.2d at p. 227].) Construing the code in this light, and looking to the object and policy expressed by the code as a whole, the court held section 523(a)(7) "preserves from discharge any condition a state criminal court imposes as part of a criminal sentence." (
479 U.S. at p. 50 [93 L.Ed.2d at p. 229]
.)
[1]
In applying section 523(a)(7) to restitution orders in criminal judgments, the Supreme Court stated: "The criminal justice system is not operated primarily for the benefit of victims, but for the benefit of society as a whole. Thus, it is concerned not only with punishing the offender, but also with rehabilitating him. Although restitution does resemble a judgment `for the benefit of' the victim, the context in which it is imposed undermines that conclusion. The victim has no control over the amount of restitution awarded or over the decision to award restitution. Moreover, the decision to impose restitution generally does not turn on the victim's injury, but on the penal goals of the State and the situation of the defendant.... [¶] ... [¶] Because criminal proceedings focus on the State's interests in rehabilitation and punishment, rather than the victim's desire for compensation, we conclude that restitution orders imposed in such proceedings operate `for the benefit of' the State. Similarly, they are not assessed `for ... compensation' of the victim. The sentence following a criminal conviction necessarily considers the penal and rehabilitative interests of the State. Those interests are sufficient to place restitution orders within the meaning of § 523(a)(7)." (
Kelly
v.
Robinson, supra,
479 U.S. at pp. 52-53 [93 L.Ed.2d at pp. 230-231],
fn. omitted.)
[2]
Although defendant dismisses
Kelly
v.
Robinson
as factually inapposite, we find its rationale equally applicable to an order in a criminal case requiring the defendant to pay restitution to a victim whose civil claim against the defendant for the damage covered by the restitution order has been discharged in bankruptcy.
In construing section 523(a)(7) to preserve from discharge a restitution order already imposed in a state criminal proceeding, the court was not
135
Cal.Rptr.3d 399]
; cf.
People v. Phu
(2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 280, 283 [101 Cal.Rptr.3d 601]
.) Secondary goals of direct restitution include rehabilitation of the defendant and deterrence of future criminality. (
People v. Jennings
(2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 42, 57 [26 Cal.Rptr.3d 709]
.)
Formerly, both restitution fines and direct victim restitution were limited to a maximum imposition of $10,000. (See Gov. Code, former § 13967, subd. (c); Pen. Code, § 1202.4, former subd. (b).) Now, however, the victim (direct) restitution statute requires the trial court to order full restitution, in the amount of the losses resulting from the defendant's criminal acts, unless the court finds clear and compelling reasons for not doing so, and states these reasons on the record. (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subds. (f), (g).)
[3]
(4) The restitution fines are not paid directly to the victims of crime. Rather, they are deposited to the Restitution Fund. (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (e).) The Restitution Fund is in the State Treasury Department, and is used to compensate victims for certain kinds of "pecuniary losses they suffer as a direct result of criminal acts." (Gov. Code, § 13950, subd. (a).) Crime victims may apply to the Restitution Fund as one avenue to recover monetary losses caused by criminal conduct. "If the victim has received assistance from the Victim Compensation Program under Govt.C. 13950 et seq., restitution to the victim is also paid to the Restitution Fund. (P.C. 1202.4(f)(2).)" (3 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 110, p. 194.) Thus, when direct victim restitution has been satisfied by the victim's application to the victim compensation program, the amounts a defendant is ordered to pay as direct victim restitution are instead paid to the Restitution Fund. "[T]o the extent that the victim has received assistance from the Restitution Fund under Govt.C. 13950 et seq...., payment must be made to the fund. (P.C. 1202.4(f)(2).)" (3 Witkin & Epstein,
supra,
Cal. Criminal Law, Punishment, § 117, p. 204.) Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (j), includes a reciprocal provision, to the effect that "[t]he making of a restitution order pursuant to subdivision (f) shall not affect the right of a victim to recovery from the Restitution Fund as otherwise provided by law, except to the extent that restitution is actually collected pursuant to the order." Thus, direct victim restitution payments, which the victim actually collects from the defendant, are offset from the victim's eligibility to recover from the Restitution Fund.
An order for direct victim restitution does not preclude a separate civil action by the victim. Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (j), also
1453
26 Cal.Rptr.3d 709 (2005)
128 Cal.App.4th 42
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Jason JENNINGS, Defendant and Appellant.
No. D043944.
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division One.
April 4, 2005.
Rehearing Denied April 26, 2005.
Review Denied July 27, 2005.
[*]
710
461 U.S. 660 (1983)
BEARDEN
v.
GEORGIA
No. 81-6633.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued January 11, 1983.
Decided May 24, 1983.
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF GEORGIA
661
524 U.S. 321 (1998)
UNITED STATES
v.
BAJAKAJIAN
No. 96-1487.
United States Supreme Court.
Argued November 4, 1997.
Decided June 22, 1998.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
322
gravity of his offense.
[15]
It is larger than the $5,000 fine imposed by the District Court by many orders of magnitude, and it bears no articulable correlation to any injury suffered by the Government.
C
Finally, we must reject the contention that the proportionality of full forfeiture is demonstrated by the fact that the First Congress enacted statutes requiring full forfeiture of goods involved in customs offenses or the payment of monetary penalties proportioned to the goods' value. It is argued that the enactment of these statutes at roughly the same time that the Eighth Amendment was ratified suggests that full forfeiture, in the customs context at least, is a proportional punishment. The early customs statutes, however, do not support such a conclusion because, unlike § 982(a)(1), the type of forfeiture that they imposed was not considered punishment for a criminal offense.
Certain of the early customs statutes required the forfeiture of goods imported in violation of the customs laws, and, in some instances, the vessels carrying them as well. See
, e. g.,
Act of Aug. 4, 1790, § 27, 1 Stat. 163 (goods unladen without a permit from the collector). These forfeitures, however, were civil
in rem
forfeitures, in which the Government proceeded against the property itself on the theory that it was guilty, not against a criminal defendant. See,
e. g.,
Harford
v.
United States,
8 Cranch 109 (1814)
(goods unladen without a permit);
Locke
v.
United States,
7 Cranch 339, 340 (1813)
(same). Such forfeitures sought to vindicate the Government's underlying property right in customs duties, and like other traditional
in rem
forfeitures, they were not considered at the founding to be punishment for an offense. See
supra,
at 330-331. They therefore indicate
341
36 Cal.Rptr.3d 814 (2005)
37 Cal.4th 707
124 P.3d 408
The PEOPLE ex rel. Bill LOCKYER, as Attorney General, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.
No. S121009.
Supreme Court of California.
December 22, 2005.
815